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Abstract
Location-Based Services (LBSs) build upon geographic information to provide users with location-
dependent functionalities. In such a context, it is particularly important that geographic locations
claimed by users are the actual ones. Centralized verification approaches proposed in the last
few years are not satisfactory, as they entail a high risk to the privacy of users. In this paper, we
present and evaluate a novel decentralized, infrastructure-independent proof-of-location scheme
based on the blockchain technology. Our scheme guarantees both location trustworthiness and
user privacy preservation.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, an increasing number of Location-Based Services (LBSs) have been released,
mostly because of the rapid expansion of the mobile device market [8]. LBSs take advantage
of geographic location to provide users with accurate and targeted information for locating
friends on a map, discovering nearby social events, generating alerts about traffic jams along
a route, and more.
To ensure that such services work properly, it is necessary that geographic locations
claimed by users are factual. For example, LBSs with location-based access control that
allow users to obtain a discount coupon, require that users cannot cheat on their position,
to avoid delivering coupons to those who really have no right to obtain them. Similarly,
social networks that enable users to discover where their friends are, are meaningful only if
geographic locations are certified.
A proof of location is a digital certificate that attests someone’s presence at a certain
geographic location, at a certain time. Different proof-of-location schemes have been proposed,
either infrastructure-dependent or infrastructure-independent. It is worth nothing that most
proof-of-location schemes are centralized, i.e., they rely on servers for storing proofs of
location, which users have to trust either explicitly or implicitly.
With the objective of achieving a system that, at the same time, provides verification
of geographic location of its users and ensures a high level of privacy to them, we have
designed a completely decentralized and infrastructure-independent proof-of-location scheme
for LBS-oriented peer-to-peer networks (like Overdrive [6] or ADGT [2]). The decentralized
nature of peer-to-peer systems guarantees higher privacy levels, as it removes the central
authority knowing both the geographic location of users and the information they exchange.
In the following, peer-to-peer network, overlay network, peer-to-peer overlay and network
are equivalent expressions we use with reference to the same concept.
Our proof-of-location scheme is based on the blockchain technology [12]. A blockchain
is a ledger that maintains a continuously growing list of ordered data blocks. Each block
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contains a link to a previous block and a timestamp. Once recorded, the data in a block
cannot be altered retroactively.
The main feature that differentiates the blockchain from all other distributed databases is
its completely decentralized nature, which escapes the presence of a trusted central authority.
Indeed, blockchain maintenance is performed by a network of communicating nodes, which
validate transactions, add them to their own local copy of the blockchain, and then broadcast
block additions to other nodes. All these operations are performed in such a way that
distributed consensus emerges among network nodes, about the information stored in the
blockchain. If a block is forged and added to the chain, other nodes will find the data to be
untrue. In the Bitcoin virtual currency system, the blockchain is used to store transaction
records [12]. In our scheme, the blockchain is used to store proofs of location.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe related work. In
Section 3, we illustrate our proof-of-location scheme. In Section 4, we analyze the proposed
scheme in terms of robustness against various kinds of attacks. In Section 5, we illustrate a
preliminary performance evaluation of the proposed scheme. Finally, we conclude the paper
with a summary of achieved results and an outline for future work in Section 6.
2 Related Work
In the infrastructure-dependent approach, a set of WiFi access points (APs) are assumed to
be available to produce proofs of location to the users.
Javali et al. [7] proposed a proof of location generation and verification scheme which
proves the presence of the user within an area of interest at a particular time and the claim is
securely verifiable by LBSs. The scheme is based on channel state information (CSI) obtained
from 802.11 WiFi packet traces and on the fuzzy vault cryptographic primitive. A server
stores the information required to verify the location claims submitted by the users.
Li et al. [10] identified a new kind of attack coined as location cheating attack in database-
driven cognitive radio networks (CRNs), which allows attackers to mislead honest users with
a fake location and make them query the database with fake locations, or allows malicious
users to claim a location arbitrarily and query the database for service. The authors proposed
an infrastructure-based scheme that relies on the existing WiFi AP network or cellular
network to provide guarantees for location cheating prevention and user location privacy.
In the infrastructure-independent approach, users receive location claims from neighbors.
Liu et al. [11] proposed a scheme denoted as CLIP, which maintains user location privacy,
allowing one to submit a portion of his mobility trace with which the commitment can be
also verified. Wireless APs or co-located mobile devices are used to generate the location
proofs. CLIP uses a lightweight spatio-temporal trust model to detect false proofs of location
deriving from collusion attacks. A prototype implementation on Android demonstrates that
CLIP requires low computational and storage resources.
Another infrastructure-independent scheme is APPLAUS [13], envisaging colocated
Bluetooth-enabled users that mutually generate proofs of location and report them to a
server. Although this solution appears effective and robust, its centralized architecture eases
tracking of pseudonym-identified users by malicious administrators, whereas it might hinder
the deployment of user-created LBSs.
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3 Proof-of-Location Scheme
In this section, we illustrate the proof-of-location scheme, by detailing the architecture of the
system, the blockchain construction mechanism, and how distributed consensus is achieved.
3.1 Architecture
We consider an LBS-oriented peer-to-peer network with mobile nodes that are connected
to the Internet through the WiFi or cellular network interface, and are able to interact
with neighboring nodes through short-range communication technologies such as Bluetooth
(Figure 1). A Prover is a node that wants to collect proofs of location from its neighbors. A
Witness for a Prover is a node that has provided a proof of location to the Prover. Every peer
i is described by a unique identifier Kpui , which is also its public key. Moreover, every peer i
is able to digitally sign messages with the private key Kpri associated with its identifier.
Figure 1 The envisioned LBS-oriented peer-to-peer network.
3.2 Blockchain Construction
We have adopted the blockchain technology to endow networked nodes with the capability
to verify and store proofs of location, not requiring a centralized supernode that oversees
sensitive data of other nodes. In our approach, recent valid proofs of location are recorded
into blocks, which are then added to the end of the chain and, once confirmed by consensus,
they cannot be changed, as shown in Figure 2.
Similarly to the solution proposed by Zhu and Cao [13], peers can communicate with near
nodes through any short-range communication technology, such as Bluetooth, Bluetooth
SMART or ZigBee, and they periodically use these interfaces to broadcast proof-of-location
requests and responses to their neighbors, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Supposing next block to be mined is Blockt, a proof-of-location request from peer i (the
Prover) to peer j (the Witness) contains the identifier Kpui and the geographic location of
peer i, as well as a hash of the latest mined block h(Blockt−1). As depicted in Figure 4, the
request is signed with the requester’s private key, so that anyone can verify that it has not
been tampered with.
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Figure 2 Proofs of location recorded in blocks of a blockchain. Every block contains a hash of
the previous block.
Figure 3 Construction and diffusion of a proof of location.
The Witness (i.e., peer j) verifies the validity of the proof-of-location request, according
to the following rules:
1. the request has to come from a peer that, beyond being in touch through the short-range
communication technology, is a known contact in the LBS-oriented peer-to-peer overlay
network;
2. the request is produced and digitally signed by the Prover;
3. the request contains an admissible geographic location, i.e., not further than the adopted
maximum distance reachable with the short-range communication technology;
4. the request refers to the end block of the blockchain; otherwise, peers start a synchroniza-
tion process via the peer-to-peer network to align their blockchains.
Once all checks have been fulfilled, a proof-of-location response is produced by the Witness,
wrapping the received request in a new message, together with its geographic location and
identifier (i.e., its public key Kpuj ). The proof-of-location response is also signed with the
private key of the Witness, as illustrated in Figure 5.
Then, the response is verified by the Prover according to the following rules:
1. the response comes from one of the peers to whom the request was sent;
2. the response is digitally signed by the peer that produced it;
3. the response contains an admissible geographic location, i.e., not further than the maxi-
mum distance that is reachable with the adopted short-range communication technology.
In case the response is correctly verified, it corresponds to a proof of location, attesting
that two peers are geographically close to each other and specifying their geographic locations.
Proofs of location are then broadcasted to the network, which records them in the public
ledger of all proofs of location, i.e., the blockchain, after validating them.
When a peer receives a proof of location declaring that another peer is located nearby,
but that peer is neither reachable by short-range communication nor belonging to the list of
G. Brambilla et al. XX:5
Reqi→j :

Kpui
〈latitude, longitude〉i
h(Blockt−1)
timestamp

Kpr
i
Figure 4 A proof-of-location request from peer i (the Prover) to peer j (the Witness).
Resj→i :

Reqi→j
Kpuj
〈latitude, longitude〉j
timestamp

Kpr
j
Figure 5 A proof-of-location response produced and signed by peer j (the Witness) for peer i
(the Prover).
known neighbors, the proof of location is discarded and not further forwarded within the
network.
Conversely, when a peer receives a proof of location declaring that another peer is located
outside the area covered by the neighborhood monitoring protocol, the former peer may
either immediately discard the proof of location (conservative approach) or use the blockchain
to compute the betweenness B of the two peers that produced the proof of location, in the
pseudonym correlation graph,1 over a limited but meaningful time period. Any peer with
B = 0 may be considered as malicious [13] and its proofs of location discarded.
Every peer in the network puts all known valid unacknowledged proofs of location into a
block, together with a reference to the previous valid block known to that peer. In addition
to proofs of location and the reference to its predecessor, the block contains the identifier of
the peer that generated it. Moreover, the block is signed with the private key of the peer
that generated it, as shown in Figure 6.
Blockt :

Resj→i
Resj→k
...
Resk→i
Kpui
h(Blockt−1)

Kpr
i
Figure 6 t-th block, produced and signed by the peer i.
Afterwards, the newly created block is broadcasted to the peers of the network, which
decide whether to add the block to the end of the blockchain or not. If the most peers add
1 The pseudonym correlation graph is an undirected graph whose vertices are the pseudonyms of the
peers and each edge denotes that there is a proof of location between the corresponding vertex pair.
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Figure 7 Valid proofs of location are persisted in the main blockchain (white blocks). Proofs of
location that precede the latest 2T blocks are no longer significant. Grey blocks compose a fork
competing to become the main blockchain. Dashed blocks are part of a past fork that has become
invalid and ignored.
the block to the blockchain, then consensus is achieved, therefore proofs of location are made
persistent. Otherwise, the block is discarded and not attached to the blockchain.
Whereupon, it is verified that the hash of the referenced block matches the end block in
the chain, otherwise a fork in the blockchain occurs. Which one branch will become part of
the main blockchain depends on the distributed consensus algorithm explained below.
Last but not least, every peer makes sure that proofs of location specified in a new block
are not already present in previous blocks of the blockchain. In case a proof of location
concerns the geographic location of the peer itself, it is checked that signatory peers of the
proof of location are known (i.e., they belong to the contact list provided by the peer-to-peer
overlay). If these conditions are not respected, the block is discarded, instead of being
propagated into the network.
3.3 Distributed Consensus
In Bitcoin, distributed consensus is achieved by means of a proof-of-work (PoW) approach.
To produce a valid block and add it to blockchain (mining process), a peer has to perform
an extremely time-consuming work characterized by low success probability. More precisely,
the miner has to randomly hash the block header until a value below a target threshold is
obtained. To encourage the competition between miners, a reward is given to the first one
that completes the work.
In the system we propose, the blockchain is built by means of a proof-of-stake (PoS)
approach, whereby next block in the blockchain is the one produced by the peer that has
obtained the majority of proofs of location in the latest T blocks of the blockchain. No
time-consuming and energy-hungry work is required for mining valid blocks. Thus, the block
mining is not rewarded. If a peer receives more than one valid block from its neighbors, it
will add to the end of its blockchain the block produced by the peer with the largest number
of proofs of location, in the latest T blocks. The latest T blocks of the chain cannot include
more than one block produced by the same peer. This is to prevent the monopoly problem,
i.e., a peer that keeps out the proofs of location that concern other peers from the block it
produces, in order to remain the owner of most proofs of location and, therefore, to take
control of the blockchain.
Preserving all block headers is sufficient to enable a simplified verification of the blockchain.
Peers are not forced to maintain a copy of all proofs of location stored in the blockchain
(similarly to lightweight Bitcoin clients [5]). The distributed consensus procedure requires
that peers preserve the latest T blocks. In order to handle forks of the blockchain, it is
prudent to maintain the latest 2T blocks. The blocks that precede the latest 2T blocks may
be pruned, as depicted in Figure 7.
The value of T is application-dependant. When it is important to store several past
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geographic locations, such as in applications for tracking and monitor vehicle fleets, T has a
larger value, compared to applications that localize nearby friends. Forensic applications may
be interested to store the whole blockchain, in order to provide effective and trusted alibis
for people under investigation. On the other hand, the lower is the value of T , the smaller is
also the space occupied in memory. Apart from this, the protocol is independent from the
application layer and highly versatile, supporting the realization of a wide range of LBSs.
4 Robustness Analysis
In the following, we analyze the robustness of the proposed scheme with respect to all major
LBS-related attacks [9].
4.1 Cheating on own geographic location
A peer could declare a false geographic location, in order to obtain a false proof of location.
Our scheme prevents this kind of attack, since each peer that receives a proof location request
or response verifies that the specified geographic location is not farther than the maximum
distance covered by the short-range communication technology.
4.2 Cheating on another peer’s geographic location
Another possible attack could hail from a peer that produces false claims about other peers’
geographic locations. Our scheme precludes such an attack, thanks to the asymmetric
cryptography mechanism, whereby all the declarations concerning geographic locations stated
by peers are digitally signed with their private keys and easily verifiable using their public
keys that correspond to their identifiers.
4.3 Replaying proofs of location
Outdated proofs of location could be re-broadcasted in the network by malicious peers,
with the purpose to forge the geographic location of other peers. Since every peer of the
network checks that the proof of location is not already contained inside the blockchain before
retransmitting it, it is not possible to successfully complete this attack. Moreover, inasmuch
every proof of location contains a reference to a block of the blockchain, it is immediately
discarded in case the referenced block is older that the latest 2T blocks of the blockchain.
4.4 Colluding with other peers
Another threat exists when two or more malicious peers collude to generate false proofs of
location. In literature, this kind of attack is denoted as Sybil attack [4]. Let us consider a
malicious peer that tries to prove itself in a geographic location that is not the actual one,
with the help of another malicious peer. The two peers agree upon producing a proof of
location attesting that their geographic locations are different from the actual ones. Then,
they broadcast the false proof of location into the network.
In most cases, colluding peers can be detected by honest peers, thanks to the short-range
communication technology. Moreover, it is unlikely that the whole list of peers provided by
the peer-to-peer neighborhood monitoring protocol is made of colluding peers. For the sake
of precision, there are three possible scenarios:
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1. Proof of location and location declared in the peer-to-peer overlay are iden-
tical and both false. If a peer receives a proof of location concerning two other peers
that claim to be close to it, it verifies that at least one of the two peers can be contacted
with the short-range communication technology; if not, the proof of location is discarded.
2. Proof of location and location declared in the peer-to-peer overlay are differ-
ent; one of them or both are false. If a peer receives from another peer a proof of
location concerning the latter peer and related to a geographic location that is different
from the one provided by the peer-to-peer overlay, such a proof of location is immediately
discarded.
3. Two peers collude to build a false proof of location for one of them. The proof
may be received by a honest peer that is far from the considered location and cannot
contact the colluding nodes with the short-range communication technology. In this
case, the honest peer may either immediately discard the proof of location (conservative
approach) or make a more contemplated decision, by evaluating the betweenness of the
two suspect peers, according to the procedure illustrated in Subsection 3.2.
Hence, collusion is hindered by information provided by peers belonging to the LBS-oriented
peer-to-peer overlay.
4.5 Determining real identities of peers
An attacker could attempt to determine the real identity of peers through full observation of
proofs of location in the blockchain. Actually, in our scheme there is no limit on the number
of identifiers. In the same way as Bitcoin users are allowed to adopt different receiving
addresses, our users can freely decide to change their peer identifiers. As proved by Zhu
and Cao [13], if a peer has the possibility to periodically change its identifier according to
a Poisson distribution, it gains unobservability and an attacker cannot determine the real
identity of the peer by observing location proof records.
5 Preliminary Performance Evaluation
Using OSMobility [3], a simulation platform for studying distributed/mobile systems within
realistic geographical spaces, we have performed a preliminary performance evaluation of our
blockchain-based proof-of-location scheme.
The simulated scenario consists of a static network with 400 peers, each one monitoring a
circular area with a radius of 2 km by means of the ADGT protocol. The fraction of correctly
pinpointed neighbors (Coverage Percentage) is 75%, in line with previous results by Brambilla
et al. [2]. Moreover, the radius of the simulated short-range communication technology is
150 m. A fraction P1 of peers produce and broadcast the proofs of location. A fraction
P2 of these Witnesses are cheating. In our simulations, we have assumed P1 ∈ {5, 10} [%]
and P2 ∈ {0, 25, 50, 100} [%]. Witnesses (including cheaters) have been randomly selected
according to a uniform spatial distribution. Upon receiving a proof of location declaring that
another peer is located outside the area covered by the neighborhood monitoring protocol,
honest peers immediately discard the proof of location (conservative approach).
In Figure 8, two measured performance indicators are reported:
1. Accepted True PoL [%], the percentage of true proofs of location that are mined into
the blockchain;
2. Accepted False PoL [%], the percentage of false proofs of location that are mined into
the blockchain.
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Figure 8 Accepted True PoL and Accepted False PoL for different values of P1 and P2, in the
considered scenario.
Plotted results (for each (P1, P2) combination) have been obtained by averaging over 5
simulation runs. Standard deviations are not reported, as they are negligible. It can be
observed that, independently of P1 and P2, all true proofs of location are always mined into
the blockchain. The percentage of mined false proofs of location converges to a value < 40%,
for increasing values of P2.
Table 1 reports the Accuracy [%], which is defined as:
Accuracy
.= 100
∑
True positive+
∑
True negative
Total population
[%]
where ∑
True positive =
∑
Accepted True PoL∑
True negative =
∑
False PoL−
∑
Accepted False PoL
Total population =
∑
True PoL+
∑
False PoL
Table 1 Measured Accuracy [%]
P2 = 0% P2 = 25% P2 = 50% P2 = 100%
P1 = 5% 100 92.6 87.2 77.2
P1 = 10% 100 92.5 84.3 73
Although these preliminary results are encouraging, we expect to achieve even better
results with the adoption of the malicious peer detection strategy based on betweenness
evaluation depicted in Section 3.2.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a novel approach for producing proofs of location, i.e.,
digital certificates that attest someone’s presence at a certain geographic location, at some
point in time whereby LBSs can validate user locations. We have illustrated a completely
decentralized, blockchain-based peer-to-peer scheme that guarantees location trustworthiness
and preserves user privacy, at the same time. We have analyzed the robustness of the
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proposed scheme against all major LBS-related attacks. Furthermore, we have presented a
preliminary simulation-based performance evaluation of the proposed scheme.
Regarding future work, we plan to implement the proposed scheme in a plug-in for
ADGT.js [1], our cross-platform, WebRTC-based realization of the ADGT peer-to-peer
overlay protocol. To this purpose, we plan to adopt the Web Bluetooth API,2 a specification
that allows web pages to discover and communicate with devices over the Bluetooth 4 wireless
standard.
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